Pedestrian Stop Analysis

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# Table of Contents

- **ILLINOIS PEDESTRIAN STOP STUDY ANNUAL REPORT 2016**  
  - BACKGROUND 2
  - UNDERSTANDING PEDESTRIAN STOP DATA 3
  - EXAMINING THE ILLINOIS PEDESTRIAN STOP DATA 18
  - CONCLUSION 21
  - APPENDIX A NON-COMPLYING AGENCIES 22
  - REFERENCES 23

This is the first annual report for the Illinois Pedestrian Stop Study. Alexander Weiss Consulting, LLC prepared the report in conjunction with the Illinois Department of Transportation.

Background

In 2015, the Illinois General Assembly passed Public Act 99-352, which supplements the Illinois Traffic Stop Study by mandating the collection of data on certain types of pedestrian stops. The law requires that data is to be collected on pedestrian stops that include “frisks, searches, summons and arrests.” Importantly, there is no requirement to collect data for a pedestrian stop that does not include at least one of the following: frisk, search, summons or arrest. In other words, if an officer stops a pedestrian but does not frisk or search the person, does not issue the subject a summons, and they are not arrested, the stop would not be reported to IDOT.¹

When a stop meets the definition stated above, the officer must record:

- Subject’s gender and race
- Reasons for the stop
- Date, time and location of the stop
- Whether or not a pat-down or frisk was performed and if so, the reasons for the pat-down or frisk and whether the subject granted consent
- Whether contraband was found
- Whether other searches were conducted, with or without consent
- The disposition of the stop and any violations, offenses or crimes charged as a result of the stop.

Agency data must be submitted to IDOT by March 1 of the year after collection. As is the case with the ITSS, agencies have 10 days to review and comment on their report. In addition to this summary report we have also prepared a report for each participating law enforcement agency.

For 2016, 507 agencies submitted pedestrian stop data to IDOT. This represents about one half of Illinois agencies. In order to account for this gap, IDOT contacted each agency about their participation. Many reported that they did not conduct any pedestrian stops that met the criteria.

Eighty-nine either did not respond to the IDOT inquiry or they did not submit their data. Those agencies are listed in Appendix A.

¹ IDOT data systems are designed to reject any stop that does not comport with this requirement.
Understanding Pedestrian Stop Data

Because this is the first time that we have reported on the pedestrian stop data, it is instructive to review the methodology and the analytical framework we use. To begin we examine the literature on the use of directed law enforcement strategies. This is relevant to both traffic and pedestrian stops.

Police agencies have become increasingly sophisticated in developing, implementing and evaluating crime control innovations designed to better respond to crime and disorder problems. Some scholars have argued that the 1967 President's Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice Committee report, as well as a series of ground-breaking field experiments that occurred in the early 1970s that tested the effectiveness of preventive patrol (the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment), of field interrogations (the San Diego Field Interrogation Experiment), and of criminal investigations (the Rand Criminal Investigation Study), highlighted a need for crime control strategies to be better informed by empirical evaluation (see, Bayley & Skolnick, 1986; Boydstun, 1975; Chaiken, Greenwood, & Petersilia, 1976; Kelling, Pate, Dieckman & Brown, 1974). The number and types of studies published during the last 40 years focused specifically on the evaluation of police strategies is remarkable, and the quality and comprehensiveness of this work has improved greatly with time.

What types of crime control strategies are particularly promising? What are some of the potential problems and pitfalls when adopting such strategies? This review is designed to answer these questions with a particular focus on strategies using police vehicle and pedestrian stops. Specifically, we first examine whether such strategies are effective as a general tool with widespread application or if it is better to focus these efforts on targeted places or types of offenses and offenders. Effectiveness is generally assessed through the impact of a strategy on crime in general or on specific crimes targeted in an initiative, like gun violence or drug crimes. Second, we explore the impact of evaluations that use such strategies as part of a broader and more comprehensive crime control strategy. Third, we discuss what we know about potential ancillary benefits and unintended consequences of such efforts.

Arguably, the first study to look at the effect of specific police crime control strategies was James Q. Wilson’s 1968 study “Varieties of Police Behavior” (Wilson, 1968). Wilson, a political scientist at Harvard University, sought to better understand what police officers do and in particular how police officers and their organizations exercise discretion in decision-making. That is, he wanted to better understand, for example, why an officer decides to stop a traffic violator, and how the officer decides what action to take.
Wilson developed a typology of policing “style” that included the watchman style, the service style and the legalistic style. In the watchman style organization, officers place a high priority on order maintenance, and the administrators of these agencies allow officers to overlook minor offenses like traffic violations. In the watchman style departments, officers are encouraged to “ignore the little stuff,” and to “be tough” where it is important.

In the service style departments, the police look seriously at all types of requests for service, but they are less likely to use legal and formal processes to intervene. While the police will pay careful attention to serious crime, they are likely to avoid arrests and citations for minor offenses. Wilson found, for example, that traffic stops in these communities were much more likely to result in a warning than in a citation.

The third style of policing described by Wilson was the legalistic style. The emphasis in such departments is on law enforcement rather than order maintenance. That is, in these departments officers will generally choose a law enforcement response to most encounters. Not surprisingly, officers in these departments were much more likely to issue traffic citations and make arrests than officers in either the watchman or service style departments. Wilson suggests that traffic law enforcement is particularly attractive in legalistic departments because “traffic law enforcement is one way to prevent accidents,” and that traffic stops are an opportunity to, “discover fugitives, stolen merchandise, illegal weapons, and stolen cars.” Moreover, he argues that the more traffic stops the agency conducts the more likely they are to catch criminals, and because they usually get positive response from this result, they are likely to make even more stops.

Wilson’s 1968 book was based largely on a qualitative study of eight law enforcement agencies, but in 1978, Wilson and his colleague Barbara Boland conducted a quantitative study to measure whether the policing style of a community had an effect on crime (Wilson & Boland, 1978). In this study, Wilson and Boland examined police activity in 35 large American cities. This quantitative study concluded that cities with the highest rate of traffic citations per officer (a measure of “patrol aggressiveness”) experienced the lowest rates of commercial robbery. They suggested that aggressive patrol strategies could affect crime in two ways. First, they argued that, “by stopping, questioning, and otherwise closely observing citizens, especially suspicious ones, the police are more likely to find fugitives, detect contraband (such as stolen property or concealed weapons), and apprehend persons fleeing from the scene of a crime.” They also suggested that, “aggressive patrol strategy will affect the crime rate directly, and not through its effect on the arrest rate, if it leads would-be offenders to believe that their chances of being arrested have increased, even though they have not.”
There are several related studies that were published at about the same time. First, one study focused on a single New York City precinct with very high levels of robbery. The precinct experienced a 40 percent increase in police presence and witnessed significant reductions in crimes occurring outdoors (Press, 1971). Second, similar results were reported by Chaiken, Lawless, and Stevenson (1974) following increased levels of directed patrol to the New York City subway system in response to high levels of robbery. Third, another study of saturation patrol in Nashville, Tennessee targeted four high crime zones. In this study, the level of increased enforcement associated with the crime reduction was quite significant. Four additional patrol cars were assigned to a zone normally patrolled by one (Schnelle et al., 1977). The crime reduction was restricted to nighttime patrols. The fact that the patrol cars were marked and that the patrols occurred at night contrasted this study with an earlier daytime burglary patrol studied by Schnelle and colleagues (1975) that concluded that there was no significant reduction in burglary.

Sampson and Cohen (1988) focused on building on this line of research by examining rates of robbery in 171 American cities with populations over 100,000. Sampson and Cohen measured aggressive traffic enforcement by recording the number of disorderly conduct and driving under the influence arrests on a per officer basis. They found that cities with more aggressive traffic enforcement had lower rates of robbery. The effects appeared to be both indirect, through higher certainty of arrest for robbery, and direct, through a general deterrent effect on potential robbers. MacDonald (2002) confirmed these findings by assessing the impact of proactive police strategies on homicides and robberies in 164 cities. He concluded that proactive police strategies led to significant reductions in violent crimes over time.

In 2010, Kubrin et al. extended this research by using data from 2000-2003 for 181 large American cities. This study concluded that proactive policing significantly reduced robbery rates, controlling for numerous structural variables. They concluded (p. 83), “the results have revealed that the negative relationship observed ... is indeed robust, at least for the sample under investigation. Proactive policing retains its statistically significant negative association with robbery rates in the more fully specified model.”

Therefore, there is strong empirical evidence that traffic law enforcement has a negative effect on crime. This effect likely works in two ways. First, traffic enforcement makes the police more visible, and thus serves as a general deterrent to crime. This is in contrast to the modest level of visibility that is derived through routine police patrol. Second, traffic law enforcement reduces crime by making it more difficult for offenders to use motor vehicles. That is, when officers stop cars they are likely to find contraband or other evidence of crime, and thus offenders may be more reluctant to use their vehicle in the commission of a crime.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) funded field experiments in Dayton, Ohio, and Baltimore County, Md., to learn more about the effects of traffic enforcement. The Dayton project was particularly informative (Weiss & Freels, 1996).

The Dayton Traffic Enforcement Experiment began in January 1992 and lasted for six months. The project was designed, in part, to better understand how traffic enforcement could be used by an agency to reduce crime. Officers participating in the experiment were instructed to enforce traffic laws in the target area, focusing on the hours of 6 p.m. to midnight. Officers were encouraged to make stops in visible areas. They either issued citations or warnings. Importantly, officers participating in the project conducted these stops as part of their normal duties. No additional officers were assigned to the target area.

The results in Dayton were mixed. Unlike previous studies, there was no reduction in robbery in the target area, but there was a relatively large reduction in auto theft. The study team expected that as a result of increased traffic enforcement the department would experience an increase in arrests for illegal guns, drugs, and other contraband in the target area. Surprisingly, they experienced a large reduction in arrests for those offenses in the target area, leading some observers to question the utility of traffic law enforcement as a tool for interrupting criminal enterprises. However, there is strong evidence to believe that the reason the police found less contraband in the target area was that offenders were avoiding the target area, thus reinforcing the notion that traffic enforcement can increase deterrence.

Much of these early research projects focused on vehicle stops used as part of a more general strategy. Other research has looked similarly at other types of strategies, such as suspicion stops. Law enforcement agencies use suspicions stops in different ways as part of crime-control strategy. Officers are asked to respond to many calls for service and interact with citizens in a variety of ways. During the course of their daily activities, officers are exposed to situations that do not appear to be neutral, but that perhaps a criminal act is in progress or is being contemplated. The officer, for example, may view behavior, demeanor, or appearance that is inconsistent with the place and circumstances at which it is occurring. Officers are allowed to investigate and determine whether further action is necessary. Such stops, guided by an officer's "reasonable suspicion," can lead to the prevention and/or detection of serious crimes in a community. The stops could potentially increase the visibility of the police, sending a message of police oversight to potential offenders that deters them from planning to commit or actually committing a crime. Stops can also lead to arrests directly as weapons or other illegal materials may be discovered, or indirectly by linking to an investigation with the information collected during the contact.
The seminal case on suspicion stops is *Terry v. Ohio* decided in 1968. In the case, Officer McFadden, a police officer of nearly 40 years in Cleveland, Ohio, observed three individuals acting in such a way that lead him to conclude that they might be planning a robbery. He explained that he had never seen these three individuals before in the neighborhood, they lingered outside a store, and they were speaking in hushed tones. He decided to stop and question the individuals, and when he could not understand their responses, he pushed them into a store and noticed a bulge in one of the suspect's jackets. He then frisked the suspects, and the frisk led to a discovery of a weapon and an arrest. The United States Supreme Court eventually reviewed the process that resulted in the arrest, and the holding provides justification for making such stops (Grano, 2013).

One important empirical evaluation of suspicion stops is the San Diego Field Interrogation Experiment (Boydstun, 1975). The experiment focused on three patrol beats, closely matched according to demographic and socioeconomic variables. Both the intensity of stops and the type of stop varied across the beats. In the control beat, suspicion stops remained at a consistent level. That is, the officers working this beat used suspicion stops as they have been traditionally deployed. In the first experimental beat, officers were provided additional training about how to effectively conduct such stops and ameliorate any friction between the department and citizens caused by the stop. In the other experimental beat, no suspicion stops were conducted. Data were collected for seven months before the experiment began, during a nine-month experimental period, and for five months after the completion of the experiment. The primary research questions focused on whether suppressible crimes (robbery, burglary, grand theft, petty theft, auto theft, assault/battery, sex crimes, and malicious acts/disturbances), arrest rates, and citizen attitudes varied over time in each beat and whether there were significant differences when compared to other beats.

There were several interesting findings. First, in the patrol beat where suspicion stops were suspended, there was a significant increase in the number of suppressible crimes. Specifically, 75 suppressible crimes occurred before the experiment, but 104 occurred during the experiment. In the post-experiment period, once suspicion stops resumed, there was a significant decrease in the number of suppressible crimes. In fact, 81 suppressible crimes occurred during the post-experiment period. The research also indicated that crime did not significantly change in the other two beats. Second, although the average number of arrests that occurred per month was not influenced by the nature of suspicious stop activities, the data showed that many arrests began as suspicion stops but the quality of such arrests was slightly lower compared to arrests made under other circumstances. The study also concluded that there were no significant demographic differences between the subjects of regular suspicion stops and those made by officers who received special training, but “the control
officers arrested significantly more Blacks, and significantly fewer Mexican-Americans and males, then they field interrogated in the study" (p. 5). Citizen attitudes toward the police were not significantly different comparing the different beats, but citizens living in the beats with specially trained officers had the most favorable reactions to such encounters. More recent research discusses that residents living in neighborhoods targeted by specific strategies may be willing to put up with the inconveniences of the strategy in the hopes of seeing a significant reduction in crime, especially if they understand the nature of the intervention (Rengifo & Slocum, 2016).

Whitaker et al. (1985) found similar results examining policing in 60 neighborhoods in three metropolitan areas. Whitaker et al.’s analysis (1985) contrasted the effects of four types of aggressive patrol on violent and property crime. The four strategies included suspicion stops, officer initiated investigations such as warrantless searches and questioning of potential witnesses, residential security checks, and order maintenance interventions. The strongest effects when comparing the different types of aggressive patrol strategy, consistent with the research by Boydstun (1975), were for suspicion stops.

In contrast, Rosenfeld and Forango (2014) examined whether suspicion stops in New York City from 2003-2010 impacted robbery and burglary rates. They found that the number of stops that occurred during this time frame increased about 15 percent, on average, and stops of Blacks and Hispanics increased at even higher rates. Rosenfeld and Forango (2014) explored whether the increases in the number of stops contributed to the declines in robbery and burglary in New York City, but concluded that there were was no relationship between the number of suspicion stops and robbery or burglary rates.

There are many types of enforcement efforts, such as directed patrol, suspicion stops, and disorder enforcement, used to respond to hot spots. One of the early evaluations of a directed patrol strategy was completed by Cordner (1981) in Pontiac, Michigan. Using crime data to identify target areas and target crimes, a special unit of officers was freed from responding to calls for service and directed toward patrol and investigation of specific target areas. The strongest finding was that the number of directed patrol arrests was associated with a decline in crime in the target area. Indeed, “every four directed patrol arrests were associated with three less target crimes in target areas” (1981: 49). The author concluded that it appeared to be the aggressive level of directed patrol, in terms of arrests, vehicle stops, and field interrogations, rather than the general increases in the level of patrol that led to the crime reductions.

Another study that examined the effects of traffic enforcement on gun crime was funded by the National Institute of Justice in Kansas City, Missouri (Sherman, Shaw & Rogan, 1995; Sherman & Rogan 1995a). The Kansas City Gun Experiment was designed to evaluate a police patrol project to reduce gun violence, drive by shootings, and homicides in a patrol beat where the homicide
rate was 20 times higher than the national average. For 29 weeks, from July 7, 1992, to Jan. 27, 1993, the Kansas City Police Department officers assigned to the project focused on gun detection through aggressive patrol, primarily traffic stops. The results of this study were quite striking:

- Gun seizures by police in the target area increased by more than 65 percent, while gun crimes declined in the target area by 49 percent.
- There was no measurable displacement of gun crimes to patrol beats surrounding the target area.
- Drive-by shootings dropped from 7 to 1 in the target area, doubled from 6 to 12 in the comparison area, and showed no displacement to adjoining beats.
- Homicides showed a statistically significant reduction in the target area but not in the comparison area.
- Traffic stops were the most productive method of finding guns, with an average of one gun found in every 28 traffic stops.
- Two-thirds of the persons arrested for gun carrying in the target area resided outside the area.

Similarly, two studies in Indianapolis help us to better understand the particular ways in which traffic enforcement and crime interact. In 1995 Indianapolis experienced a significant increase in violent crime, much of it related to street-level drug sales. Based on the results from Kansas City, the Indianapolis Police Department conducted a small project to test whether increasing traffic stops could reduce crime (Weiss & McGarrell, 1999).

In the “Safe Streets” Project, Weiss and McGarrell analyzed eight beats in Indianapolis that experienced high levels of aggressive traffic enforcement during a six-week period. In this study, officers patrolled an extra four hours at the end of their shift; thus there were more police on patrol than the prior comparison time. Beats experiencing a significant decrease in reported burglaries and auto vehicle thefts were those in which officers concentrated solely on stopping as many vehicles as possible. Significant reductions in auto vehicle theft were also realized in other beats where officers focused on consent searches for drugs and greater use of computer criminal history checks of persons and vehicles. In addition, there was a diffusion of program benefits to contiguous beats.

One of the most rigorously conducted studies of traffic enforcement and crime was conducted in Indianapolis in the summer of 1997 (McGarrell, Chermak, Weiss, & Wilson, 2001). Building on their experience in the “safe streets” project, the Indianapolis Police Department launched a more refined and carefully implemented effort to measure the effect of directed patrol on crime.
IPD applied directed patrol tactics in two police districts in two different ways. The East District followed a general deterrence strategy in which officers stopped many vehicles, issued many citations, and made one felony arrest for every 100 traffic stops. The North District employed a targeted deterrence strategy. They assigned fewer officers, and although they stopped fewer vehicles and issued fewer citations they made almost three times as many arrests for every 100 stops than the officers in the East District. This research produced several important findings.

- Specifically, the north target area experienced a 29 percent reduction in firearms-related crime and forty percent reductions in aggravated assault with a firearm and armed robbery. Homicides were reduced from seven to one comparing the same 90-day period of the prior year with the project period.

- Homicides declined in the east target area (four to zero) but there was no decline for other firearms-related crimes. Indeed, the east area experienced increases very similar to those observed in a comparison area.

- The absolute number of illegal firearms seizures was quite similar in the two target areas (42 in north, 45 in east). For the east target area, however, this represented a greater increase in firearms seizures (50 percent increase) than was the case in the north target area (8 percent increase).

The authors relate the differential findings to the type of strategy used in the different beats. In the east district, a general deterrence strategy was employed that relied heavily on maximizing the number of vehicle stops. The idea was to create an enhanced police mechanism for uncovering illegal weapons, drugs, and other illegal activities. The north district, in contrast, employed a specific deterrence or targeted offender strategy. This approach sought to maximize stops of particularly suspicious activities and to conduct more thorough investigations upon a vehicle or pedestrian stop. It too sought to identify illegal firearms, drugs and illegal activities.

The two strategies were evident in the activity data. The east district officers made twice as many vehicle stops and issued more traffic tickets than did north district officers. The north district officers made more felony arrests per officer hour and uncovered more firearms per officer hour. North target vehicle stops yielded higher rates of citations (versus warnings), arrests, and gun seizures per vehicle stop. It appears that the activity levels in the north target area were more similar to the levels in the Kansas City Gun experiment than were the activity levels in the east district.

Thus, one potential explanation for the differential effects is that the targeted offender approach was a more effective mechanism for reducing firearms-related
violence. It may be that the targeted offender approach sent a message of increased surveillance and individuals most likely to engage in violent crime were less likely to carry a firearm. This is in contrast to the wider net approach observed in the east target area. This finding is consistent with prior research that suggested that crackdowns that focus on specific types of crime in specific locations have the most effect on crime (Sherman, 1990). This is not to imply that the removal of illegally possessed weapons is unimportant. The total number of firearms seized in both districts was nearly equal. Indeed, it may be that the focus on illegal firearms helps to direct officers toward the appropriate suspicious targets for investigation and that the subsequent removal of illegal firearms provides an incapacitation effect.

The results of other studies are consistent with these results. For example, from July to October 1998, the Pittsburgh police department conducted increased patrols in two intervention areas to assess the impacts on gun-related crimes (Cohen & Ludwig, 2003). Although the officers were relieved of calls for service responsibilities and were expected to make traffic stops and/or stop and talk with suspicious individuals, the intensity of this intervention was described as being somewhat less intense compared to other evaluation studies (Koper & Mayo-Wilson, 2012). On average, only five additional officers patrolled in the target beats during specific hours—which increased police presence by about 50 percent in one target area and 25 percent in the other area. The officers on these patrols made approximately 200 contacts, 18 arrests, and seized 7 guns, although “it is not clear that gun seizures increased over normal levels” (Koper & Mayo-Wilson, 2012, p. 25). As the study was a quasi-experimental design, researchers compared shots-fired calls and gunshot injuries before and after the patrols were implemented, to similar areas, and to days when the patrols were active to when they were not in the targeted areas.

The findings indicated that the number of shots fired calls and the number of gunshot injuries in the targeted neighborhoods were significantly reduced. In addition, the number of gun assault injuries declined significantly. In the target areas, injuries declined over 30 percent during the intervention and actually rose by nearly 50 percent in the comparison areas. Both shots fired and gun injuries were significantly less likely to occur on nights when the patrols were active compared to when they were not. Their overall conclusion was that “the similarity in off-day trends between the treatment and control zones provides at least suggestive evidence of a deterrent effect that is specific to the treatment zones during the on days when the program is in effect and only reduces illegal gun carrying and misuse during those times. The absence of significant trends upward in the control areas during the program period also seems to rule out spatial displacement, where gun-carrying offenders shift their activities from the treatment to control neighborhoods” (p. 238).

Police departments have used various other enforcement strategies to target problem hot spots, but the conclusions are quite similar: Such tactics have
promising implications for reducing crime and disorder problems. Research by Green (1996), a study that focused specifically on reducing drug-related crime using a multi-dimensional problem solving approach, supports the thesis that focused enforcement in crime hot spots can have a positive effect on crime. Green found that combining traditional enforcement tactics with other problem solving techniques (e.g., fire and housing code violations, no trespassing orders, problem tenant eviction, etc.) resulted in declines in reported drug crime activity. An evaluation of the Boston Police Department’s Safe Street Teams that focused on using problem solving strategies to address the city’s most violent hot spots found that a variety of such approaches led to significant declines in crime and no spillover effects into other areas (Braga & Schnell, 2013).

One of the most celebrated incidents of crime reduction was the substantial violent crime decline that occurred in New York City in the early 1990s. Although there are many competing theories that have been proposed to account for the crime drop (see Rosenfeld & Fornango, 2014; Braga, Welsh & Schnell, 2015), most discussions have focused on changes that occurred in the New York City Department, including the implementation of a management accountability system (e.g., Compstat) and widespread adoption of disorder reduction strategies. Specifically, in 1994, the New York City police department implemented many order-maintenance policing (OMP) strategies, including using frequent stops of potential gun and drug offenders, but also aggressively responding to various disorder offenses (Fagan & Davis, 2000). There are competing conclusions about whether such strategies impacted the crime drop. Some scholars argue that such strategies had no impact (Harcourt & Ludwig, 2006; Greenberg, 2014), others argue modest impacts (Messner et al, 2007; Rosenfeld, Fornango & Rengifo, 2007), and still others argued it caused the significant declines in crime (Corman & Mocan, 2005; Kelling & Sousa, 2001; Fagan & Davis, 2000).

This existing research highlights the importance of understanding not only whether such crime control strategies impact crime and measures of disorder, but also whether there are ancillary benefits or unintended costs of such strategies. For example, if citizens think that such strategies are unfairly targeting some groups and are excessively intrusive, the benefit of some decrease in crime has to be weighed against the alienation of the public. Moreover, if citizens do react to these efforts in a negative way, the long-term result may actually be an increase in crime because citizens may fear crime and be less willing to participate in the “collective efficacy” of their neighborhood (Kochel, 2011; Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls 1997; Weisburd, Hinkle, Famega, & Ready, 2011). Some of this research indicates that such targeted approaches using suspicion stops and directed patrol efforts does not impact citizen opinions and may even have some positive effects. Other research has highlighted concerns about racial discriminatory practices, unconstitutional use of such strategies, and negative impacts on perceptions of fear of crime, disorder, and police legitimacy. These studies are discussed below.
Most of the literature on the public’s perceptions of the police has focused on identifying the important variables that explain general attitudes toward the police (Decker, 1981). Although it is difficult to state precisely the predictors of unfavorable attitudes toward the police because of contradictory findings, there are some consistent patterns. Research indicates that blacks are significantly less supportive of the police than whites (Decker, 1981; Erez, 1984; Hadar & Snortum, 1975; Scaglion & Condon, 1980; Smith & Hawkins, 1973; Webb & Marshall, 1995). Social economic status appears to influence public attitudes. As income increases, favorable attitudes toward the police increase (Jacob, 1971; Webb & Marshall, 1995). Residential location, prior victimization experience, and police contact variables are also important (Cao, Frank, & Cullen, 1996; Carter, 1985; Dean, 1980; Dunham & Alpert, 1988; Jacob, 1971; Kusow et al., 1997; Murty, Roebuck, & Smith 1990; Scaglion & Condon, 1980; Smith & Hawkins, 1973). Most studies find that gender and education have no effect on public attitudes toward the police (Hadar & Snortum, 1975; Jesilow, Meyer & Namazzi, 1995; Kusow, Wilson, & Martin, 1997; Murty, et al., 1990). Although many studies find that teenagers are less satisfied with the police than adults (Kusow et al., 1997; Hadar & Snortum, 1975; Smith & Hawkins, 1973), other research indicates that age is not related to attitudes toward the police (Jacob, 1971; Reising & Correia, 1997; Kusow et al., 1997).

This body of research, however, has neglected public attitudes towards specific police strategies. Webb and Katz (1997: 8) state: “although a great deal is known about the public’s general attitudes toward the police, relatively little is known about their assessment of specific police activities.” There have been a few studies published that examine public attitudes toward aggressive traffic enforcement strategies (Bordua & Tifft, 1971; Dunham & Alpert, 1988; Webb & Marshall, 1995; Webb & Katz, 1997; Fagan, 2002). For example, one of the five attitude scales used in research by Dunham and Alpert (1988) and Webb and Marshall (1995) is called the “Patrol” Scale. This scale measures the approval of active patrol strategies including stop and frisk and random car check activities. Webb and Marshall (1995) found that younger and less educated respondents were less supportive of these types of strategies, but did not find any differences in approval of these strategies by race. In contrast, attitudes about active patrol varied considerably by race in the study by Dunham and Alpert (1988). They found that Cubans agreed strongly with the police using aggressive patrol strategies, whites only weakly agreed with the use of these strategies, and blacks disagreed with the use of these strategies.

These studies examine attitudes towards specific patrol strategies in the abstract. Support for active patrol strategies may increase or decrease after a police crackdown has occurred. Not many studies have had the opportunity to examine public opinion of these strategies while a crackdown is in progress or immediately after an initiative. There is some research that is informative. Uchida, Forst and Annan (1992) tested whether various police strategies impact crime and drug trafficking in specific beats of the cities examined. Drug trafficking
and other violent crimes were reduced in each city. The researchers also tested whether citizen perceptions of crime changed after the implementation of these strategies. The results were mixed. In one city, they found that perceptions on whether drug trafficking was a problem declined in beats where a crackdown and high visibility patrol occurred and in beats where a crackdown and door-to-door interviews with citizens occurred (p. 3). Citizens were also more satisfied with how the police handled neighborhood problems in these areas. In another city, where the primary interventions included “buy and bust” activities and door-to-door interviews with citizens, citizens thought the police were more responsive to community concerns, but these interventions did not change their perceptions of the amount of drug trafficking (p. 3-4). Although these researchers examined how citizen perceptions of the level of crime and police respond to problems in the neighborhood, they did not examine support for the types of strategy used or support for the police in general.

James Shaw (1995; see also Sherman & Rogan, 1995) was able to examine citizen reaction to the increased presence in the target area in the Kansas City Gun Experiment. Shaw completed resident interviews before and then seven months after the proactive patrols were implemented. The results indicated that residents in both areas were interested in seeing the patrols implemented. Nearly 90 percent of the residents in the experimental area and over 80 percent of the residents in the comparison area said that this type of enforcement was good for the neighborhood (p. 704). The results also indicated that the residents in the experimental area were slightly more likely to believe police patrols increased, were more satisfied with their neighborhood and believed it changed for the better, and were more likely to say that social disorder had declined. The residents in the experimental area also thought the problem associated with drugs and guns had improved and levels of fear declined.

In Indianapolis, residents of the communities expressed support for the Indianapolis Police Department’s directed patrol program and expressed support for the department. In spite of the fact that officers stopped nearly five thousand vehicles, no complaints were filed against officers assigned to the project (Chermak, McGarrell, & Weiss, 2001). The level of change in citizen attitudes from the period before directed patrol to that following directed patrol was quite modest. The findings revealed that there was a high level of citizen awareness and support for IPD’s directed patrol effort. The results were consistent for both target areas and for whites and African-Americans. Two-thirds of the sample expressed favorable opinions and high levels of support for IPD. In terms of the assessment of impact on perceptions of crime, there was some modest evidence of positive effect for directed patrol. Specifically, the number of respondents stating that drugs and guns were major problems in their neighborhoods declined by the end of the directed patrol initiative. Further, residents of the target areas were more likely to report positive changes in their neighborhood than were residents of the comparison area. On the other hand, there was little evidence
that the project had an effect on fear of crime or significantly affected perceptions of the quality of life in the neighborhood.

Boydstun's (1975) study of suspicion stops concluded that the frequency and types of suspicion stops had no effect on police-community relationships. The majority of citizens supported the use of such stops, and individuals stopped by the officers given special training reacted somewhat more favorably to being stopped compared to those citizens stopped by officers that did not receive the training.

There are several other studies that have highlighted several concerns about the deployment of proactive, aggressive police strategies. Concerns are primarily raised about racial bias, whether police officers violate the law when implementing such strategies, and how such tactics impacts the public.

Over the last 40 years, there has been a significant number of studies that have highlighted racial disparities in general arrest patterns driven in part of a nationwide crackdown on drugs (see Riksheim & Chermak, 1992). One of the results has been a broader dialogue about racial profiling by police officers (see Beckett, 2016; Kochel, 2011; Sherman, 1984). Some research has highlighted that both traffic stops by police (see Cole, 1999; Veneiro & Zoubeck, 1999; Harris, 1999; Weitzer, 2000, Langan et al., 2001; Gross & Barnes, 2002; Harris, 2002, Lundman & Kaufman, 2003; Durose et al., 2005) and suspicion stops (see Alpert et al., 2005; Fagan, Zimring & Kim, 1998, Geller & Fagan, 2010; Greene, 1999, Skolnick & Caplovitz, 2001; Fagan & Davies, 2000, 2003; Fagan, 2002; Gould & Mastrofski, 2004) target minority citizens, concentrate in minority communities, and increase involvement of minorities in the criminal justice system. For example, Gelman, Fagan, and Kiss (2007) argued that minorities were three times more likely than whites to be stopped and frisked in New York City, that policing was concentrated in neighborhoods with the concentrations of minority residents, but the racial differences could not be explained solely by the differences in crime rates across neighborhoods. Moreover, Fagan, Gellar, Davis, and West (2010) concluded that stops of minority residents in New York City continued to be disproportionately higher even after crime rates declined. They concluded that “the dramatic increase in stop activity in recent years is concentrated predominantly in minority neighborhoods, and that minority residents are likely to be disproportionately subjected to law enforcement contact based on the neighborhoods in which they live rather than the crime problems in those areas. Moreover, this disproportionate contact is based on more than the level of neighborhood crime and disorder; demographic makeup predicts stop activity above and beyond what local crime conditions suggest is necessary and justifiable” (p. 311).

Gelman et al. (2007) analyzed over 100,000 suspicion stops by the New York City Police Department over a 15-month period. Such stops were an integral part of the department's crime control strategy instituted in the 1990s and some argue
that these tactics were an important factor in the general decline of crime and violent crime in New York City (see Greene, 1999; Ridgeway, 2007; Rosenfeld & Fornango, 2014). Their analysis of these stops indicated that Blacks and Hispanics were disproportionately targeted by the police (see also, Ridgeway, 2007). Specifically, Blacks accounted for 51 percent and Hispanics accounted for 33 percent of the stops, while each only for approximately 25 percent of the population. They concluded (p. 18): “In comparison to the number of arrests of each group in the previous year (used as a proxy for the rate of criminal behavior), Blacks were stopped 23 percent and Hispanics 39 percent more often than whites. Controlling for precinct actually increased these discrepancies, with minorities between 1.5 and 2.5 times as often as whites (compared to the groups’ previous arrest rates in the precincts where they were stopped) for the most common categories of stops (violent crimes and drug crimes), with smaller differences for property and drug crimes. The differences in stop rates among ethnic groups are real, they are substantial, and they are not explained by previous arrest rates or precincts.” The Rand Corporation completed a similar study just a couple of years after this research was published (Ridgeway, 2007). Rand concluded that nearly 90 percent of the nearly one-half million stops analyzed involved nonwhites that over 45 percent of nonwhites were frisked when stopped compared to less than 30 percent of whites, but whites were significantly more likely to have had a weapon when stopped. In contrast to the Gelman et al. (2005) study, the author of the Rand report concluded that the racial disparities were consistent with the racial distribution of arrestees (p. 43).

Suspicion stops are an important crime control tool (Raymond, 1999). Gelman et al. (2005, p. 6) argued that “pedestrian stops are at the very core of policing, used to enforce narcotics and weapons laws, to identify fugitives or other persons for whom warrants may be outstanding, to investigate reported crimes and “suspicious” behavior, and to improve community quality of life.” But, if such practices impact citizen attitudes towards the police, or if citizens feel as if they are targeted by police practices, they are more likely to question the legitimacy of the police. In addition, research indicated that conducting such stops are rare, and when made, they rarely lead to the discovery of weapons and arrest (Alpert, et al., 2005; Fagan, et al., 2010; Fagan & Gellar, 2015). For example, Gould and Mastrofiski (2004) directly observed police decision-making regarding suspicion stops to explore how often police officers search, how often those searches are legal, and why do officers not follow the law. Their research highlighted several interesting findings. First, similar to Alpert et al.’s (2005) observational study that indicated officers only make about 1 stop per shift, the officers in Gould and Mastrofiski study rarely search suspects--conducting less than one search per every eight hours of observation. Second, when searches occur, however, thirty percent of the suspects were searched in a way that violated the law and they found that illegal searches were significantly more likely to occur when the suspect was released compared to when they were arrested (see also, Fagan, 2013). Third, compared to numerous other variables, they found that certain situational characteristics, such as officers looking for drugs or guns on a
suspect, and the age of the suspect significantly increased the likely that an officer would conduct an illegal search. They also found that “most violations of suspects' rights are not exceptionally invasive.... but that “the steady stream may do more long-term damage to police legitimacy than a series of egregious cases, especially because so few of the unconstitutional searches ever reach the inside of a courtroom” (p. 334).

Some research concluded that having police crackdowns in a targeted area increased citizens fear of crime in those areas (Hinkle & Weisburd, 2008; Kochel, 2011; Rosenbaum, 2006), increased mistrust of the police (Fagan, 2001; 2002), decreased willingness to cooperate with the police (Fratello, Rengifo, & Trone, 2013), adversely impacted the collective efficacy of residents (Kochel, 2011; Rengifo & Fratello, 2015; Rosenbaum, 2006), impact the mental health of those stopped (Gellar, Fagan, Tyler & Link, 2014), and diminished the acceptance of the legitimacy of the police (Brunson & Weitzer, 2009; 2011; Kochel, 2011; Rengifo & Fratello, 2015; Rosenbaum, 2006; Tyler, Fagan, & Gellar, 2014; Weitzer & Tuch, 2002). Often such targeted patrol strategies occur in places where levels of distrust of the police are already high and collective efficacy is weak. Residents, when they see an intensified police presence, they might simultaneously think crime has gone up and there is a need for such police activity and/or that they police may be targeting the people that live in their neighborhoods. Kochel (2011: 17) argued that “police must recognize that in hot spots, they are working with populations who are more skeptical and less trusting of the police. Therefore, aggressive or intrusive policing tactics, while effective as short-term crime fighting strategies, may have long-term implications for police legitimacy.”

Several important studies have provided insights into some of the potential costs of such stops by surveying youth/young adults targeted by such efforts (Gellar, et al., 2014; Tyler, Fagan, & Gellar, 2014). First, Tyler et al. (2014) used telephone survey data from New York City young males (18-26 years old) to explore how their contacts with the police department, including whether and how frequently they were stopped by the police in the past year and in their lifetime, impacted perceptions of policing. Over 80 percent of the respondents said that they had been stopped by the police at some point in their lifetime and more than half had been stopped in the last year in a car or on the street. Respondents who were stopped at any point in their life rated police legitimacy as being significantly lower. Importantly, their examination of more recent stops indicated that more intrusive stops and the frequency of stops resulted in significantly more negative evaluations of legitimacy: “In other words, whether the police threatened or used force or were humiliating or disrespectful were the strongest predictors of respondents' assessments of police legitimacy”(p. 765). They also found that citizens who perceived the police to be fair when conducting such stops, then acceptance of the legitimacy of the police was much higher. They found that those citizens that are the most accepting of police legitimacy, were more likely to cooperate with the police, call the police, and less likely to be involved in
criminal behavior. Second, Gellar et al. (2014), using these same data, concluded that individuals who are stopped more frequently and believed the stop was intrusive by the police experienced higher levels of anxiety and more trauma symptoms. They argued that such stops often involve the use of force or the use of rough tactics by the officer and interviewees that noted being involved in the most intrusive encounters also had the highest health impacts (p. 2324).

Other research, however, offers a contradictory perspective on these issues and concludes that the backlash effects of such strategies are overstated (Braga & Bond, 2009; Weisburd et al., 2011; Braga et al., 2014). Weisburd et al. (2011) conducted an experimental test of how a police crackdown intervention on disorder-related problems in 55 targeted street blocks in three cities in California impacted fear of crime, collective efficacy, and police legitimacy. The police intervention that was used in these targeted beats was a combination of a “broken windows” style approach to disorder where officers would respond aggressively to loitering and drinking in public with three additional hours of police patrol on each targeted block in the study. Residents and individuals working for businesses in the targeted areas were interviewed before and after the invention was deployed. Contrary to other studies that have examined how such strategies impact residents, Weisburd et al. (2011) found that such activities did not increase the concerns about fear of crime, decrease residents willingness to collaborate collectively, or decrease feelings of police legitimacy.

Examining the Illinois Pedestrian Stop Data

For the first year of our study, Illinois law enforcement agencies reported 133,485 pedestrian stops. In our analysis of traffic stop data we always provide a statewide analysis. In this case, such an approach would be inappropriate because 81 percent (108,692) of the pedestrian stops were conducted by the Chicago Police Department.

Instead, we have illustrated an agency report and will provide a guide as to how these reports should be interpreted. Readers should be cautious in drawing conclusions from agency data with limited pedestrian stops. Many of the agency reports include a handful of stops, thus reducing the reliability of the percentage measures.

The first section of the report includes community demographics. For each agency we provide the population data for each racial category as defined by the statute, and the percentage for that race of the whole. This data comes from the 2010 U.S. Census, and our counts include persons 15 years of age and older—the same approach that is used for the traffic stop study.
In this study, we used the population data for the community that the agency serves. This is a different approach than the traffic study in which we attempted to account for the mobility of motor vehicles. Our analysis for pedestrian data is based on the assumption that the population of persons in a community “at risk” for being stopped is largely the same as the population of the community where the stop occurs.

In the next section of the report, we describe stops that include a pat down. Recall that if there is no pat down, search or arrest or summons, it is not included as a stop. In this section we provide a series of relevant percentages.

- Stops by Race shows the percentage of all stops by category—for example, 31.21 percent of all stops were of white subjects and 40.94 percent of all stops were of black subjects. A reader can compare those percentages with the population characteristics (e.g. 42.82 percent white, 24.08 percent black)
- Stops with a pat down shows the percentage of stops within that race with a pat down. For example, there were 93 stops of white subjects and 82 of those stops involved a pat down.
- The next two rows describe the percentage of pat downs that were conducted based on consent (68.29 percent) or reasonable suspicion (31.71 percent) within race.

The third section describes stops in which a search occurred “beyond the pat down.” In this study searches are considered a subset of pat downs. That is, we are capturing searches that result as a result of the pat down. For this first year analysis, we are only considering those cases in which the search emanated from a pat down that was conducted by consent. In this way, we can track those stops in which there was not reasonable suspicion to conduct the pat down.

- Search beyond pat down conducted describes the percentage of searches that came from stops with a pat down within race.
- The next six rows capture the percentage of stops with a search based on consent, probable cause and incidental to arrest, and whether those searches resulted in the discovery of contraband.

Finally, we illustrate whether the stop resulted in a summons or arrest with each race. The lower portion of the report provides the raw data used to construct the analysis.
### Illinois Pedestrian Stop Study, 2016

**Agency:** COOK COUNTY SHERIFF

#### Community Demographics

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<td></td>
<td>47.82%</td>
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#### Pat Down Stops

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<td>68.29%</td>
<td>53.21%</td>
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<td>Pat Downs Conducted by Reasonable Suspicion</td>
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<td>46.79%</td>
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#### Search Beyond Pat Down

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<td>15.85%</td>
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#### Outcome of Stop

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<td>Stop Resulted in a Warning or Citation</td>
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<td>35.23%</td>
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<td>Stop Resulted in a Custodial Arrest</td>
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#### Key Indicators

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<td>Total Stops</td>
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**Figure 1 Sample Pedestrian Stop Report**
Conclusion

This report describes the results of the first year of data collection of pedestrian stops. Like any similar undertaking, it can be instructive to review the work to date and identify opportunities to enhance the analysis. We believe that there are two important methodological issues to examine.

First, the enabling legislation requires that data be collected when a pedestrian is detained, and they define detention as a frisk, search or arrest/citation. It might be more informative, in our view, to examine a larger universe of stops. The key factor should be whether a person stopped based on reasonable suspicion feels as though they are free to leave. This may be a more instructive definition for “detention.” Perhaps that is a more appropriate definition of detention.

Second, IDOT gathers data about the reasons that an officer used to justify the pedestrian stop. There are several categories, and the law indicates that all of the relevant items should be checked. While this approach might be useful to get a comprehensive perspective, it is impossible to summarize that data in a meaningful way for 1,100 agencies. We suggested that officers be required to indicate the factor that was most important in influencing their decision, but representatives of the law enforcement community rejected the idea.
## Appendix A Non-complying Agencies

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References


Skogan & K. Frydl (Eds.), Committee on Law and Justice, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. Washington: The National Academies Press.


